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CASES NOTED
restraint of both is their own and the community's protection.2 1 Thus,
the same standard should logically limit their respective freedoms.22
It is submitted that the argument advanced by Justice Wilson fails in
that even those alleged insane cannot be summarily deprived of liberty.23
In the absence of actual violent insanity,24 the alleged sexual psychopath
should be entitled to bail. However, the bond set may be high enough
to insure societal welfare and deter the recidivistic tendencies of the sex
offender.25
EVIDENCE-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES-RIGHT TO
DETERMINE PRIVILEGE OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
Plaintiffs, wives of civilian observers killed in the crash of an Air Force
plane, sued for wrongful death under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' They
sent written interrogatories 2 requesting copies of the accident report, but
the Air Force refused to release them, claiming a privilege of non-disclosure.3
The district judge ruled that the United States should produce the docu-
ments for his examination and allow the court to determine whether they
are privileged. Upon failure to comply with this ruling the court issued
an order establishing the facts in plaintiffs' favor and enjoined the United
States from introducing evidence to controvert them.5 Held, a claim of
privilege involves a justiciable question, to be determined by the court on
examination of the documents in camera6 and ex parte. Brauner et al. Y.
United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
21. People v. Chapman, supra note 10; but see People v. Sims, supra note I1.
22. See Karpman, supra note 16.
23. In re Cornell, Ill Vt. 525, 18 A.2d 304 (1941) (temporary restraint justi-
fiable only if being at large would create danger); Reagan v. Powell, 125 Ca. Rep. 89,
53 S.E. 580 (1906) (alleged insane person entitled to bail pending appeal from sanity
hearing; this right to be denied only if mental condition becomes sufficiently violent tojustify summary process); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Il,
24 Tax. L. REv. 307 (1946) (only five states provide by statute for arrest of alleged
mental defective at time of service of notice of hearing. The general criteria is danger
to self and others.).
24. In which case petitioner should be committed under the mentally ill section
of the statutes. Application of Keddy, 233 P.2d at 163, 164 (Cal. 1951); Ex parte
WVestcott, 93 Cal. App. 575, 270 Pac. 247 (1928).
25. Ex Parte Morehead, suPra note 2 (pattern of past crimes indicated sufficient
recidivistic tendency to warrant setting bail at $7,500). Thus, circuitously, the courts
can prevent the release of those individuals who are dangerous without arbitrarily con-
fining the lesser offenders.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. (1946).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (allows written interrogatories to be answered by the adverse
party); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (one showing good cause can require production of documents
not privileged).
3. 17 STAT. 283 (1872), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946) (provides that the heads of depart-
ments are to prescribe regulations for use, custody, and preservation of classified records,
not inconsistent with law).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (i) (ii) (provides for refusing evidence to contravert
facts and establishes the evidence of moving party as true).
5. 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
6. A hearing before the judge in his private chambers.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
At common law an action would not lie against the sovereign except
by express consent. 7 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act" the United
States consented to be held liable for tort claims "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."'9 It
was early held that the Rules of Procedure apply equally to the government
and private litigants, 10 especially as to discovery before trial.1 ' One limita-
tion on discovery against the government is the common law claim of
privilege against disclosure of secrets of a diplomatic or military nature.12
Department heads by statute may also claim privilege as to departmental
documents.'8 This latter "privilege" is subject to an exception where the
opposing party has shown that facts necessary to his suit are exclusively
within the possession of the government and public policy will not suffer
by making them known.' 4
At a cursory glance it would seem that the government has consented
to pre-trial discovery to the same extent as individuals.10 However, in recent
cases'8 the government has asserted that it has the exclusive right to deter-
mine this "privilege" without judicial review. The Supreme Court has
admonished that a privilege "should be restricted to its narrowest bounds."17
Nevertheless the trial judge is allowed wide discretion18 to determine whether
good cause' 9 exists, and upon a showing of such will require production of
the disputed records.
The government relied on two English cases"0 to support its contention
that administrative heads should determine the extent of the privilege. But
the British government is not one of checks and balances or separation of
7. BL. COMM.* 261 (1753).
8. Supra note 1. Section 2674.
9. Interest before judgment and punitive damages are exceptions.
10. Sherwood v. United States, 112 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1940); Cresmer v. United
States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D
Pa. 1948); United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Il. 1942).
11. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 10, at 530.
12. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378 (3d ed. 1940).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. United States v. Cotton Valley Oil Operators Comm., 339 U.S. 940 (1950);
Cresmer v. United States, supra note 10; Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
801 (S.D.N.Y, 1948).
15. Berger and Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451
S1950). But see O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of
overeign Immunity?, 21 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1942).
16. United States v. Cotton Valley Oil Operators Comm., su/ra note 14; Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950).
17. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947).
18. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); Alltmont v. United
States, subra note 16; Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (WD. La. 1950);
Wunderly v. United States, supra note 10.
19. Whether special circumstances make it essential to the preparation of the
party's case to see the documents sought.
20. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co., [19421 A.C. 624 (administrative board
decided it was privileged a refusal to divulge records); Lord's Comm'rs of the Admiralty
v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co., [19091 S.C. 335 (administrative board
has discretion to rule on records).
CASES NOTED
powers as is that of the United States.2 The court relies mainly on United
States v. Cotton Valley Oil Operators Committee,2 2 where the Supreme
Court ruled that it would decide if a privilege existed and rejected the
claim of the Attorney General to determine if F.B.I. records were within
the privilege.
This case23 and others recently decided 24 act to curb the mushrooming
administrative power of the executive branch of the government from
usurping judicial functions. This is in line with the checks and balances
system under our Constitution and is in harmony with the doctrine of
separation of powers.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PHOTOGRAPH
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued defendant publisher for the unau-
thorized use in its magazine of plaintiffs' photograph, taken without their
consent at their place of business. The photograph's caption and an
accompanying article described the photograph as typical of an unwhole-
some marital relationship. Held, the publication of the photograph and
accompanying article is an invasion of the plaintiffs', right of privacy and
is actionable. Bill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952).
In the United States the acceptance of the invasion of the right of
privacy as an independent tort was first crystallized in the nineteenth
century writings of two eminent authorities.' Although it has been stated
that the right of privacy is not subject to concrete definition,2 it neverthe-
less has been defined by a number of courts3 and legal writers, 4 as the
right to be let alone,3 or the right to live in seclusion without being sub-
jected to unwarranted and undesired publicity6 or the right of a person of
ordinary sensibilities to be protected from mental suffering, shame or
humiliation.7 The right is essentially personal and does not survive after
death in the absence of a contract.8 The courts have held that the action
21. 192 F.2d at 997 (1951).
22. 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
23. Brauner v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
24. United States v, Cotton Valley Oil Operators Comm., supTa note 14; Evans v.
United States, supra note 18; Cresmer v. United States, supra note 10; Wanderly v.
United States, supra note 10.
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
2. Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943).
3. Cf. Mavity v. Tyndall, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947).
4. Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COL. L. REv. 693 (1912); MeClean, The
Right of Privacy, 15 GREEN BAG 494 (1903); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV.
L. REv. 343 (1915). But see Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932).
5. Barber v. Time, Inc., 438 Mo. 199, 159 S.W.2d 510 (1942).
6. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942);
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 867 (1939).
7. McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945).
8. Lunceford v. Wilcox, 80 Misc. 194, 88 N.Y.S.2d 225 (City Ct. 1949).
